

Alternatives to Locke's position

1. Body, material substance

- a) Being the same body (mass of matter) as A is a necessary condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are not* the same body (mass of matter) but A and B *are* the same person.
- b) Being the same body (mass of matter) as A is a sufficient condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are* the same body (mass of matter) but A and B *are not* the same person.

2. Soul, finite intelligence, immaterial substance

- a) Being the same soul (immaterial substance) as A is a necessary condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are not* the same soul (immaterial substance) but A and B *are* the same person.
- b) Being the same soul (immaterial substance) as A is a sufficient condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are* the same soul (immaterial substance) but A and B *are not* the same person.

3. Man, animal life

- a) Being the same man (human animal) as A is a necessary condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are not* the same man (human animal) and A and B *are* the same person.
- b) Being the same man (human animal) as A is a sufficient condition of being the same person as A.
Refuted if A and B *are* the same man (human animal) and A and B *are not* the same person.