Warren and Brandeis argue that there is a common law right to privacy. They believe that this right primarily protects people from the publication of private information and images.
Most of our discussion involved attempts to come up with longer lists of the sorts of things that a right to privacy might protect and the kind of psychological harm that the violation of this right might involve.
In the light of our discussion, I think these distinctions might be helpful.
The aim of a right of privacy, of course, is to bring what is in fact private in line with what should be private. It’s an interesting question exactly how rights would accomplish this. Warren and Brandeis proposed two mechanisms: torts (the ability of someone whose right to privacy has been violated to sue the violator) and injunctions (courts could prevent the publication of material that would violate a privacy right).
It’s harder to see how a right to privacy could prevent cases under 2a. Maybe I haven’t thought about it enough, though. There could be rights to make people shut up or cover up.
We should probably have a sub-distinction between legal and moral rights. As Warren and Brandeis point out, there will not be a legal right if the damages are too small to be worth society’s efforts at enforcement; that’s why they don’t think there is a privacy right against the oral publication of private information (p. 217). But there could still be a moral right against, say, gossip.
I asked what sorts of things we thought are private. Our answers typically reflected our opinions about what should be private, for understandable reasons.
I think our answers fell into the following categories.
Here’s a more abstract point. Warren and Brandeis struck me as having been most interested in personal information and personal images. I think those should probably be kept separate. Imagine a written description of what I look like naked. That would give you a lot of information. But it seems to me to be a different thing to have a picture of me in the buff.** Yeah, the information could be presented in a way that’s as humiliating as a picture, but I’m not sure if that’s a feature of the information as opposed to the way it’s presented. I’m not sure why I find these two things different, but I do.
Another way of identifying the scope of the right to privacy is to start with the feelings that we associate with its violation and then work our way back to what causes us to have those feelings.
We listed the following.