

Aristotle's politics

1 The good

“the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. ... the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others—if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097b7-1097b22)

“... human greed is an insatiable thing. Thus two obols is enough at first, but once that has become traditional, they go on always asking for more, until they go beyond all limit. For there is no natural limit to desires, and satisfying them is what the many spend their lives trying to do.” (Aristotle, *Politics* II.7, 1267a41-b4.)

2 The state

“[A state] is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for to choose to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life.” (Aristotle, *Politics* III.9, 1280b32-1281b2.)

3 Origins

- 1 “The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants ... when several families are united ... the first society to be formed is the

village. ... When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly ... self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

2 Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity ... the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

3 Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.¹ Nature ... makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals ... the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

4 ... A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society." (Aristotle, *Politics* I.2, 1252b13-1253a39.)

¹ "Social creatures are such as have some one common object in view.... Such social creatures are man, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane. Again, of these social creatures some submit to a ruler, others are subject to no rule: as, for instance, the crane and the several sort of bee submit to a ruler, whereas ants and numerous other creatures are subject to no rule." (Aristotle, *History of Animals*, I.1, 488a8-13.)