

## Authorization in the social contract

### 1 chapter 18, par. 6

1. Nothing that *A* does can be unjust to *A*.
2. Subjects authorize their sovereign's actions.
3. Therefore, sovereigns cannot treat their subjects unjustly.

### 2 chapter 18, par. 4

1. *A* cannot accuse *A* of breach of covenant.
2. Subjects authorize their sovereign's actions.
3. Therefore, subjects cannot accuse their sovereign of breach of covenant.

### 3 chapter 18, par. 7

1. *A* cannot justly punish *B* for *A*'s own actions.
2. Subjects authorize their sovereign's actions.
3. Therefore, subjects cannot justly punish their sovereign.

### 4 chapter 18, par. 3

1. It is unjust for *A* to do something that may be punished by *A*'s authority.
2. Subjects authorize their sovereign's actions.
3. Sovereigns may punish subjects who attempt to depose them.
4. Therefore, it is unjust for subjects to attempt to depose their sovereign.

Does this help?

“... when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he *ought*, and it is his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being *sine jure*; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that *injury*, or *injustice*, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done.” (ch. 14, par. 7)