Ethical Theory Spring 2021

Reply to Harman


Harman argues that moral facts do not explain anything. In particular, he maintains, they are not part of the best explanation of what he calls moral observations. If you see some hoodlums burning a cat and think “that’s wrong!”, the best explanation of why you have that observation is that you believe cruelty towards animals is wrong. There is no need to assume that it actually is wrong in order to explain why you have the thoughts about it that you do.

By contrast, Sturgeon believes, we do need to assume there are facts about the natural world that explain why scientists make the observations that they do. That is the point of his example of the vapor trail in the cloud chamber. The best explanation of why the scientist observes the trail is that a proton went through the chamber.

Sturgeon argues that moral facts do explain things. Specifically, he thinks that moral facts explain both why people do the things they do and also why they have the thoughts (“observations”) that they do. Moral facts could not explain anything if they did not exist. Since they do explain things, they must exist. That’s the idea.

Sturgeon’s Examples

Here are three examples of moral facts that Sturgeon cites in support of his thesis.


Moral fact: Hitler was morally depraved

What it explains:

Midshipman Woodworth

Midshipman Woodworth was supposed to lead a rescue of the Donner Party, whose members were trapped in the Sierra Nevada mountains.

Moral fact: Woodworth was no damned good.

What it explains:


Moral fact: slavery in North America was “much worse than previous forms of slavery in Latin America” (Sturgeon 2006, 131).

What it explains (this encompasses both observations and actions): “why vigorous and reasonably widespread moral opposition to slavery arose for the first time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centures, even though slavery was a very old institution; and why this opposition arose primarily in Britain, France, and in French- and English-speaking North America, even though slavery existed throughout the New World” (Sturgeon 2006, 131).

Sturgeon on Harman

Sturgeon takes Harman to be saying this: you would have thought that cat burning was wrong even if it was not wrong (Sturgeon 2006, 133). Let me explain that.

Harman thinks that your psychology provides the complete explanation of why you think cat burning is wrong. Since he also thinks that it is not, in fact, wrong, he has to think that the facts about whether it is right or wrong play no role in explaining why you believe what you do. In other words, you would believe it is wrong even though it is not actually wrong. After all, you do believe it even though, as he sees it, it is not actually wrong.

Sturgeon think that what makes the act wrong is that it is an act of gratuitous cruelty. If it were not wrong, then it wouldn’t be an act of gratuitous cruelty. Suppose, for instance, the children were petting the cat instead of lighting it on fire. But if that is what they were doing, we wouldn’t think that it was wrong.

Sturgeon also thinks that moral facts are relevant to explaining what happened. For example, Hitler instigated the Holocaust because he was morally depraved.

He thinks Harman would reply that moral facts are irrelevant to the explanation. Hitler did what he did because of what he wanted and what he believed. Whether his mind was morally depraved or not is irrelevant to explaining his behavior (Sturgeon 2006, 135).

Sturgeon’s answer is that Hitler’s having the beliefs and desires that he did is what made him morally depraved. He thinks you can’t separate the natural facts from the moral ones in this case (Sturgeon 2006, 136).

Sturgeon’s discussion of Harman closes with some thoughts about how our moral theories could lead us astray. He concedes that this is possible, but maintains that the same is true of scientific theories. A false moral theory will lead to false observations about right and wrong but a false scientific theory will also lead to false observations about the natural world (Sturgeon 2006, 136–37).

Key Points

  1. Why Sturgeon thinks his examples show that moral facts are part of the best explanation of why things happen and why we make the moral observations that we do.

  2. How Sturgeon handles the “you would have believed it was wrong even if it was not wrong” argument.


Sturgeon, Nicholas L. 2006. “Moral Explanations.” In Arguing about Metaethics, edited by Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin, 117–44. New York: Routledge.