Locke on Property
Overview
Sometimes, Locke uses a wide notion of the term “property”. For
example, he says that people unite for “the mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name,
property.” (§123, also §87). Here, the word “property” refers to, well,
life, liberty, and material goods.
Other times, he uses “property” with a narrower meaning to refer to
rights to material goods. This would be the “estates” part of “lives,
liberties, and estates.” We are talking about this narrower use of
“property” today.
In §42 of the First Treatise, Locke tells us that there are
three sources of rights to material things.
- Labor (“the product” of “honest industry”)
- Inheritance (the “fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended on
him”)
- Charity (“a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep
him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise”)
Chapter five of the Second Treatise is about labor.
The questions Locke poses for himself in this chapter are:
- How did we make the transition from common ownership to private
property?
- How is the inequality in wealth that comes with private property
compatible with the equal ownership rights that God gave us?
The transition question
Generally speaking, it is a good idea to look very carefully at the
beginning of a piece of philosophical writing. That is where
philosophers set out the question that they intend to answer. In this
case, Locke set a very specific question for himself. You can’t
understand what he is doing in the rest of the chapter unless you
understand the question he is trying to answer.
The problem, as Locke sets it out, is to explain how we moved from
common ownership of the earth’s resources to private ownership
without any explicit agreement of the common owners (namely,
all of humanity) to allow some people to take parts of the earth’s
resources as their own, private property.
Locke’s contemporaries held that this transition involved the consent
of the common owners. Locke accepted the criticisms of this view laid
down by his adversary Filmer but he rejected Filmer’s view that there
are no private property rights outside of the state. (For the curious, I
will post some of this background material below). That is why Locke tried to show how
common ownership became private ownership “without any express compact
of all the commoners” (§25).
The labor theory of property rights
Locke’s answer to his question invokes what is called the labor
theory of property rights. The idea is that people acquire property
rights to material goods by laboring on them.
Locke thought it was obvious that people are permitted to use the
Earth’s resources without getting permission from everyone else first.
What is the point of God’s giving us the world if we have to meet an
impossible condition before we are permitted to eat? This gets us up to
labor because the way we acquire goods like food is by laboring: picking
fruit or killing deer.
But this is not enough to get to property rights. Part of what it
means for you to have a property right to something is that others are
bound by duties not to use that thing. So far, Locke has shown that God
must have allowed people to use things in nature. He has not shown that
anyone else has an obligation to let them keep the things they take out
of nature. This is not really an issue with food like venison or acorns:
once they have been eaten, no one else is going to get them (or want
them). But if one person is to have ownership of a piece of land, then
others are going to have to have duties not to cross that land or take
any crops that grow on it even when they could do those things. It is
those duties that Locke has to explain.
In short, Locke needs to explain how the fact that an individual
labors on something does two things:
Terminates the rights of the common owners.
Generates obligations for others not to use that thing.
He has two ways of doing these things.
An answer based on a natural rights story about mixing labor with
resources.
An answer based on a proto-utilitarian story about how giving
property rights to those who labor serves the good of mankind as a
whole.
Locke thinks of these stories as coming to the same conclusion:
people have property rights to the things they work on. We talked about
the first, natural rights, answer in class. We did not say much about
the second, proto-utilitarian answer since we are going to talk about
full-blown utilitarianism later; for those who want more, I added some
notes on it below.
The natural rights answer
The natural rights story goes like this:
- You come to own a thing by mixing something that you own with
it.
- Everyone owns their labor power.
- Working on something involves mixing one’s labor power with that
thing.
- Therefore, working on a thing is a way of coming to own it.
Locke insists on some important qualifications. Specifically, he says
that property rights cannot be acquired if one of the following
conditions is met:
The things acquired will spoil or go to waste. E.g. you collected
more acorns than you can eat and they will rot or you fenced in more
land than you can cultivate and it will go to waste.
One person’s acquisition of the things will not leave “enough and
as good” for others. E.g. if there is only one source of water in our
area, I cannot come to own it as my private property because others
would not have enough and as good for themselves.
Someone does not have enough while another person has more than
he needs. E.g. a rich person’s surplus belongs to a needy poor person
(see §42 from the First Treatise, p. 3 in the
reading).
In a nutshell, you can labor very hard but if you wind up mixing your
labor with too much stuff, you just lose your labor rather than gaining
rights to the stuff.
One thing we are going to do is talk about criticisms of the labor
theory. One thing I would like you to think about is what Hobbes would
say about it.
The inequality question
Locke’s first question is about the transition from common to private
ownership. The second question concerns inequality.
Locke announces at the beginning of §31 that “It will perhaps be
objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of
the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may engross
as much as he will” (§31). This is a problem because Locke thinks there
are limits to what a person can take. God gave the world to humanity in
common and that means people cannot take things for themselves if they
will spoil or if it means that others will not have enough. More
generally, it raises a question about whether the inequality that comes
with private property is compatible with God’s original grant of the
Earth’s natural resources to mankind in common. Roughly, if God gave the
Earth to everyone, how come the rich own so much more of it than the
poor do?
The rest of the chapter, §§31–51, attempts to answer that objection.
Locke tries to show that his theory of private property does not allow
people to take too much for themselves.
He goes through three stages of society showing how private property,
as he understood it, does not lead either to spoilage or leaving others
without enough. On the contrary, societies that have private property
rights are thousands of times more productive than societies without
them. So everyone in these societies is much better off than they would
have been in a world without private property rights. That means
everyone still has what they were given by God when they were given the
Earth in common.
In sum, unequal wealth does not bother Locke. What is troubling, he
claims, is a situation in which people do not have enough. Any
inequality above that, provided goods are not allowed to spoil, is
acceptable.
Main ideas
These are the things you should know from today’s class.
- The problem of moving from common ownership to private
ownership
- The labor theory of property
- The concern about some people owning too much and how Locke tried to
address it
- Why Locke thinks that the institution of private property makes
everyone better off
Everything above this point concerns material we covered in class.
I’m going to add two sections below on material that was mentioned but
not discussed in much depth. Think of it as extended class time for
those who want more but optional for those who have already had their
fill.
Background
Locke’s thesis is that he can explain the transition from common
ownership to private ownership without appealing to the consent of the
common owners. Here are some passages from his contemporaries that put
some of the contending views on display.
John Selden, among others, maintained that the transition from common
to private ownership had involved consent.
if … all men were indifferently and without distinction Lords of the
whole, before a division was made of some parts, then of necessity we
must conceive, they all ought to remain, equally and without
distinction, Lords of those parts which never came under a division,
even as they were before, unless some compact or covenant intervene
whereby all kind of ancient right or title of common interest shall be
so renounced, that any persons whatsoever might afterwards become
particular masters of those places which should remain vacant or
undisposed, who should first corporally seize them with an intent of
possessing, holding, using, and enjoying. … it must be yielded, that
some such compact or covenant was passed in the very first beginnings of
private Dominion or possession, and that it was in full force and virtue
transmitted to posterity by the Fathers who had the power of
distributing possessions after the flood. (Selden 1652, 22–23)
Robert Filmer criticized this attempt at explaining private
property.
How the Consent of Mankind could bind posterity when all things were
common, is a point not so evident: where children take nothing by gift
or descent from their parents, but have an equal and common interest
with them, there is no reason in such cases, that the acts of the
fathers should bind the sons. I find no cause why Mr. Selden should call
community a pristine right; since he makes it but to begin in
Noah, and to end in Noah’s children, or grand-children at the most.
(Filmer 1680,
213)
Certainly, it was a rare felicity, that all the men in the World at
one instant of time should agree together in one mind, to change the
Natural Community of all things into Private Dominion: for without such
an unanimous Consent, it was not possible for Community to be altered:
for, if but one man in the World had dissented, the Alteration had been
unjust, because that Man by the Law of Nature had a Right to the common
Use of all things in the World; so that to have given a Propriety of any
one thing to any other, had been to have robbed him of his Right to the
common Use of all things. … If our first Parents, or some other of our
Forefathers did voluntarily bring in Propriety of Goods, and Subjection
to Governours, and it were in their power either to bring them in or
not, or having brought them in, to alter their minds, and restore them
to their first condition of Community and Liberty; what reason can there
be alleged that men that now live should not have the same power? So
that if any one man in the World, be he never so mean or base, will but
alter his Will, and say, he will resume his Natural Right to Community,
and be restored unto his Natural Liberty, and consequently take what he
please, and do what he list; who can say that such a man doth more than
by Right he may? And then it will be lawful for every man, when he
please, to dissolve all Government, and Destroy all Property. (Filmer 1680,
234–36)
Locke disagreed with Filmer’s conclusions. He thought that there are
private property rights that constrain the state while Filmer thought
the state had absolute power and was not bound to respect private
property rights. But Locke also accepted Filmer’s criticism of the
argument based on consent. Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise is
an attempt to show that you can accept Filmer’s criticism without
accepting his conclusions.
The proto-utilitarian answer
Here is another way of explaining the relevance of labor to property
rights that you can find in Locke’s presentation. This story is an
ancestor of a view that will come to be known as utilitarianism. We did
not talk about this in class, but it’s interesting enough to merit some
discussion here.
The proto-utilitarian answer goes like this.
- God gave the Earth’s resources to people for the purpose of
preserving mankind.
- Labor vastly improves the resources available for the preservation
of mankind.
- No one will labor unless they can have private property rights to
the things they labor on.
- Therefore, there should be private property rights that go to those
who labor.
It seems to me that this more implicit in some of the things Locke
says than an explicit theory. You can see the idea in Locke’s invocation
of God’s command that we “labor” and “subdue the earth, i.e. improve it
for the benefit of life” (§32), his claim that God gave the earth “to
the use of the industrious and rational” for the common “benefit, and
the greatest conveniences of life,” (§34) and his claim that everyone
ought, “when his own preservation comes not in competition … as much as
he can, to preserve the rest of mankind” (§6).
One thing to note about this is that any property rights it
establishes will be weaker than those established by the natural rights
story. If violating someone’s property rights would help preserve
mankind, then it is hard to see why that would not be OK on this story.
That would help this story to address the tension between the limits on
property rights and the labor theory: if taking property from the rich
is needed to save the poor, that’s OK because saving the poor without
seriously hurting the rich is a way of preserving mankind.
In fact, I would think that people would be required to
labor if the were Locke’s story. Labor improves the resources available
to preserve mankind, after all. If so, they would not have much control
over how they spend their time. That is why I have doubts that this is
what Locke really meant. I believe he thought people really do own their
own lives and have liberty to decide how to use their labor power.
References
Filmer, Sir, Robert. 1680. “Observations Upon H.
Grotius De Jure
Belli & Pacis: Together with Directions
for Obedience to Governours in Dangerous and Doubtful Times.” In
The Free-Holders Grand Inquest Touching Our Sovereign Lord the King
and His Parliament to Which Are Added Observations Upon Forms of
Government. London.
Grotius, Hugo. 1925. De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres. Vol. 2.
The Classics of International Law 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Locke, John. (1680) 1995. Two Treatises of Government. Edited
by Mark C. Rooks. The Philosophical Works and Selected Correspondence of
John Locke. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation.
Pufendorf, Samuel. 1749. The Law of Nature and Nations. Edited
by Jean Barbeyrac. 5th ed. London.
Selden, John. 1652. Of the Dominion, or Ownership, of the Sea.
London.