Overview

When he was setting out his moral theory, way back in section 3.1.2, “Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense”, Hume posed the question of whether morality was natural or artificial. He said it was both: see point 5 in the outline of that section. We have covered the artificial virtues and now it is time to do the natural virtues.

Artificial vs. Natural Virtues

Before we get into the weeds, here are a few points just to refresh your memories.

1. “Natural” is the opposite of artificial. The natural virtues are virtues without any artificial conventions. The artificial virtues are virtues only because of artificial conventions.

2. Virtue concerns motivations. If we call someone virtuous, or vicious, it is because of our evaluation of that person’s motives.

3. In particular, what makes someone’s motives virtuous or vicious is that they would produce a special feeling of approval in a disinterested observer, meaning someone who is not personally affected by the behavior of the person under evaluation.

In the case of the artificial virtues, the motive to act justly or keep promises produces approval in a disinterested observer only because of artificial conventions. Without the conventions, the motives to do what is just or to keep your promise would not make sense, since there would not be any such thing as property or promises. Even if they were intelligible, those motivations would not produce approval since respecting property and keeping promises only produces good in the context of a larger convention.

The natural virtues are different. They produce approval without conventions. A disinterested observer will approve of the relevant motivations on their own, without artificial conventions.

What are the motives for doing what is naturally virtuous? They vary, as we will see. But one thing seems pretty clear: they don’t rely on a sense of duty. Here are some examples in the sections on the artificial virtues that make this point.

These passages are from the section on justice, that is, property.

To suppose that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive which produced the action, and rendered it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be derived from some virtuous motive: and, consequently, the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard.

Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty; but enters into all our reasonings in common life, though perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms. We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shews a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent. Were not natural affection a duty, the care of children could not be a duty; and it were impossible we could have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring. In this case, therefore, all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty.

Here is a man that does many benevolent actions; relieves the distressed, comforts the afflicted, and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers. No character can be more amiable and virtuous. We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity. This humanity bestows a merit on the actions. A regard to this merit is, therefore, a secondary consideration, and derived from the antecedent principle of humanity, which is meritorious and laudable. (3.2.1, par. 4-6)

This is from the section on promises.

No action can be required of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive capable of producing the action. This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation; and where an action is not required by any natural passion, it cannot be required by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now, it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought that promises had no moral obligation, we never should feel any inclination to observe them. This is not the case with the natural virtues. Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children, but he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human creature had that inclination, no one could lie under any such obligation. But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises distinct from a sense of their obligation, it follows that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force antecedent to human conventions. (3.2.5, par. 6)

The natural virtues, for Hume, are easy. People who want to do good things for others are virtuous. Simple. It is the artificial virtues that are hard. People want to do their duty just because or even if it is bad? What’s the point of that?

What is the theory of the natural virtues?

At first glance, finding a theory of the natural virtues seems hopeless. There are so many motivations that could provoke a disinterested observer’s approval! We could make a list, perhaps, but a theory? What kind of generalizations could we possibly make?

Hume is undaunted. In fact, he has a very neat and tidy classification system that, he claims, covers all the natural virtues. A natural virtue is a character trait that is either immediately agreeable or useful either to the person who possesses it or to others (see 3.3.1 par. 24-29).¹ Here are some example to show how it works. The columns are about character traits, the rows are for people who either possess the traits or others.²

But Hume does not just classify the natural virtues. He has an explanation of why the natural virtues cause feelings of approval in disinterested observers (and why vices produce feelings of disapproval). It involves sympathy.

We have met sympathy before. Hume said that the disinterested observers approve of respecting property rights and doing what you promise because the conventions of property rights and promising serve the general good. The disinterested observers approve of justice and promise keeping by because they sympathize with the public good (see 3.2.2 par. 24).³ Now we are finally getting a proper discussion of it.

Look carefully at paragraphs 7-10 of the section “Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices” (3.3.1). That is where sympathy is discussed in the most detail.

Outline of “Of the Origin of the Natural Vices and Virtues” (3.3.1)

1. Recap the basic elements of his moral theory. Roughly, why do we have the feelings of approval and disapproval about people’s character that we do? (par. 1-5)

2. Sympathy. Hume gives a variety of examples to suggest that there is a general phenomenon of sympathizing with the feelings of others; it is not just a feature of moral cases. (pars. 6-11)

3. Natural vs. artificial virtues. The expression of natural virtues in action is always good; the expression of artificial virtues is good only by virtue of conventions. (par. 12-13). These paragraphs bear on some of the paper topics, like the one about paying the seditious bigot and the one about Abby’s question about bad conventions.

4. Objection 1: our sympathy varies more than our moral feelings do, therefore, the moral feelings are not caused by sympathy. E.g. we sympathize more with people close to us than we do with strangers, but we think strangers are just as virtuous as people who are close to us (provided they have the same qualities, of course). Hume says that we adjust our feelings, much as we do with vision: a mountain looks tiny from far away but you know it would look large if you were closer. He says you do something similar with your sympathetic feelings. (par. 14-18)

5. Objection 2: we judge someone virtuous even if he does not do anything good if he is prevented from doing good by his circumstances: “virtue in rags is still virtue.” But we should only sympathize with what people actually do; we can only sympathize with the real benefits to mankind, not just the benefits that a person might have produced in different circumstances. Hume says that sympathy is generated by thinking about the typical causes of benefits. If a house is well built, we like it even if no one lives there. Similarly, if someone has a good character, we will approve of that. (par. 19-22)

6. Objection 3: Hume said our generosity is limited when he was talking about justice; why think our sympathy is so expansive? Hume says it just works that way, using analogies with houses again. (par. 23)

7. Categorization: natural virtues are immediately agreeable or useful to the possessor or to others. See the table above. (par. 24-29)

8. A pretty tidy summary of the whole thing. I kind of wish he had said this at the beginning (par. 30).

9. How do judgments about virtue and vice lead us to behavior: rewarding virtue and punishing vice? Our author says “we have treated of this more fully on another occasion.” OK, then. (par. 31)

Outline of “Of Goodness and Benevolence” (3.3.3)

This is fairly simple. Benevolent people are ones that want to do good for others. Some of the qualities that are included under benevolence are generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinteredness, and liberality (3.3.3 par. 3). The disinterested observer sympathizes with the people who benefit and so approves of the person with a benevolent character.

The most interesting paragraph is the second one. There Hume says that most people’s generosity is limited to a fairly small circle. We judge their benevolence by comparing it with what is normal. That is, we are not going to compare someone to the most self-sacrificing person imaginable. It seems to me that this has some implications for our questions about the relationship between the natural and artificial virtues. In particular, we will come back to it when we are discussing Peter Singer next week.

The second paragraph also gives Hume’s description of how we adjust our sympathies. The problem was mentioned in the previous section: we sympathize most with people close to us but we feel moral approval of people who are far away. Hume tries to explain away this apparent mismatch between the feelings of sympathy and the feelings of approval by saying it works like the way we adjust what we think about mountains. From far away, they look small, but we know that they are actually large; we adjust our belief about the height of the mountain to something like “what it would look like if I were close.” Hume says that we make similar adjustments to our sympathetic feelings and that this explains why we have the disinterested moral feelings that we do.

Is it clever? Definitely. Is it true? I have no idea. Hume certainly is not giving any independent evidence to suggest that it is. His argument is more along the lines of “it would save my theory if this plausible hypothesis were true.”

Hume explains why disinterested observers would approve of benevolent people in paragraphs 4-7; this will not be surprising. He discusses negative emotions like anger and cruelty in paragraphs 8-9. The final paragraph is a summary.

Outline of “Of Natural Abilities” (3.3.4)

1. The topic here is: what is the difference between moral virtues and natural abilities such what we would call intelligence (“sense and knowledge” or “parts and understanding” for Hume).

   Hume’s answer is that there is not a significant difference here. Natural abilities can be as agreeable or useful as moral qualities. (par. 1)

2. Objection: the feelings of approval for natural abilities are different from the feelings of approval for moral virtues. Hume answers that we have different feelings for different virtues as well; this is the point about Cato and Caesar. So that is not a deep difference between natural abilities and moral virtues. (par. 2)

3. Objection: natural abilities are involuntary while moral virtues are not. That is a difference! You know what Hume is going to say here having read his section on free will. Really, the point is obvious if you take the object of moral evaluation to be a person’s character. I think this paragraph is very important for the paper topic on the apparent unfairness of morality as Hume understands it (par. 3)

4. Hume offers a diagnosis of why the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary seems to separate natural abilities from moral virtues. Morally virtuous behavior, and perhaps even morally virtuous character traits, are more open to social manipulation than natural abilities are. We focus on voluntary actions because praise and blame can cause people to behave in better or worse ways. (par. 4)

5. Why we approve of natural abilities. Hume is particularly interested in showing that the reasons why natural abilities are thought to be good are very similar to the reasons for approving of moral virtues such as industry, perseverance, temperance, frugality, wit, eloquence, and good humor. Some of this feels more like a list of interesting observations than examples marshaled to make a point, I have to admit. (pars. 5-13)

6. Our esteem of people’s natural abilities varies according to their social stature and importance. But not the moral virtues? I’m not clear on that. (par. 14)

Outline of “Conclusion of this Book” (3.3.6)

1. Hume repeats his case for the importance of sympathy (pars. 1-2).

2. Why Hume thinks his theory paints morality in a good light (par. 3).

3. Remarks on the sense in which justice is fixed rather than arbitrary. Justice depends on conventions, but they are conventions that have to benefit humanity in order to gain approval. And the conventions are created to solve problems that every society faces such as material scarcity and limited generosity. (pars. 4-5)

4. A remark about the kind of theory Hume is proposing. It is meant to describe morality rather than to exhort people to be moral. There is a difference between an anatomist and a painter. (par. 6)

   Remember this when we get to Nietzsche’s reference to the English toads.