Overview

Peter Singer is a famous utilitarian. Utilitarians believe that the right action or policy is the one that produces the most overall utility compared with all the alternative actions or policies. “Utility” generally means “happiness.”

Hume was clearly an inspiration for utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth-century philosopher who coined the term “utilitariansm” (he said it came to him in a dream) was inspired by Hume. He said that he “felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes” when he read Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (Bentham [1776] 1977, 440n).

You can see how this would have worked. Hume thinks that we approve of character traits and motives that are either immediately agreeable or useful to the person who has them or to others. In the case of the artificial virtues, others benefit from the motive to do one’s duty only because conventions exist; without conventions, dutiful behavior would often be either useless or bad. As Bentham probably read him, Hume was saying that conventionally moral behavior makes sense because, and only because, it is useful.

In this article, Singer is doing something more modest than argue for full-blown utilitarianism. He is trying to prove that giving famine aid is morally mandatory. I want to compare Singer’s approach to moral philosophy with Hume’s. Why? I think that comparing the two will give us a better sense of what Hume is saying.

Hume and Singer

On the face of it, Hume and Singer have very different projects. Hume is interested in describing moral thinking. He wants to know how there could be such a thing as morality as we understand it. Singer, by contrast, is interested in normative conclusions. He takes the existence of morality for granted. His project involves telling people how they ought to think and behave rather than explaining why they think and behave as they do.

In addition, Hume is concerned with motives rather than actions. Singer, by contrast, focuses on actions rather than motives.

But there are some points of contact as well. Singer can find inspiration in Hume’s idea that disinterested observers approve of motives that tend to serve the general good. And Hume’s remarks about the natural virtue of benevolence seem to be right on target.

What do you think Hume would make of the suggestion that it is inconsistent to feel that you should save the drowning child but not feel that you should save victims of famine?

Do you think that Singer’s style of philosophy would make any sense to Hume? Or, to put it another way, how would Hume understand what Singer is trying to do?

Conversely, what would someone like Singer make of Hume’s project? I can imagine some impatience: “you are speculating about the origins of morality while people are dying!” But I can also imagine that Hume’s refusal to take ordinary morality at face value could be appealing to a reformer like Singer.

Singer’s Argument

As I said, Singer is trying to prove that giving famine aid is morally mandatory. Here is his argument for that conclusion.

1. Suffering and death are bad. [Moral Assumption]

2. If (a) it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, (b) without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, (c) we ought, morally to do it. [Moral Principle]

3. We could prevent suffering and death by giving aid without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. [Factual Assumption]

4. Therefore, we ought, morally, to give aid. [Conclusion]

The balance of the article involves taking up and answering objections to points 2 and 3: questions about the moral principle are discussed on pp. 236-39; questions about whether famine aid really would relieve suffering are taken up on pp. 239-43.

Philosophy courses usually focus on the principle. It has two parts:

1. A part explaining why we have duties: we have to prevent suffering and death.

2. A part that makes exceptions: we do not have to prevent suffering and death if doing so means making a specified kind of sacrifice.

Singer proposes two different versions of his principle. They vary in the part that makes exceptions.

Strong: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it.”

Moderate: “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.” (p. 231, 241)

Outline of Singer’s Article

These are the major parts of Singer’s article. I find flat outlines like this helpful for following the course of an argument. Even though they aren’t very detailed, they keep me oriented. And because they aren’t very detailed, they are not hard to make.

1. Introduction to the problem (229-31).

2. Two versions of the principle he wants to defend and the basic argument in its favor (231–32). (This is the part that we will focus on in our discussion.)

3. Objections to Singer’s basic argument for his principle: the famine case is unlike the drowning child case (232–35).

4. Radical consequence of the argument: many acts that, according to commonsense ideas of morality, are merely matters of charity are in fact moral duties (235–36)

5. Objections to the principle itself. The objections maintain that an argument that conflicts too much with our commonsense understanding of charity and duty must be mistaken. Singer argues that we should admit that our commonsense understanding of these matters is indefensible (236–39).

6. Objections to the practical steps Singer recommends. These objections accept the idea that we’re required to give to those in need but they express doubts about whether privately provided famine relief will meet this goal. The third point isn’t really an objection but more of a question: how much should we give? (239–43)