Kant and Hume both use terms like “reason” and “the will.” Do they mean the same thing by those terms? If not, it will be a lot harder to figure out where their disagreements, if any, lie.
I think we get a decent amount of insight into what Kant thinks a will is in today’s reading. I find “reason” to be a bit elusive.
I do not have time to do a thorough outline for the reading right now. I hope to get back to it later in the week.
The reading is short, but dense.
It seems to me that there is a break at about 412. Everything up to that point has been recapitulating what he has said before. I intend to concentrate on the material from 412-419 in class.
There are a few nuggets in the first part that caught my eye.
First, he slips into characterizing acting “in conformity” with duty as acting out of self-interest where acting in conformity with duty is contrasted with acting from duty (406-407). I think this is a mistake, as the benevolent person is not naturally characterized as acting out of self-interest. Kant himself had said that the benevolent person’s motivation is what he calls an “inclination” rather than self-interest and I think he was right to do that (see 398, for example). So I’m not sure why he seems to be going back on that here.1
Second, he describes sincerity in friendship as a duty (408). I don’t think Hume would disagree, exactly, but I also think Hume would say that duty is not what motivates people to care for their friends. Compare Hume.
Now, it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought that promises had no moral obligation, we never should feel any inclination to observe them. This is not the case with the natural virtues. Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children, but he has also a natural inclination to it. (Treatise 3.2.5 par. 6)
I think Hume is probably right. The idea that my friends treat me well out of duty gives me the willies. But that does raise the question of what the duty to be a true friend involves. Why do we have it?
Third, he has an interesting argument that our idea of moral perfection cannot come from God (409). He also keeps insisting that the moral law applies to all rational beings, which would have to include God. That is why it morality cannot depend on human nature, in his opinion (410-412).
Look carefully at what he says about two topics.
the will (412)
hypothetical imperatives (414-417)
The main topic of discussion is going to be what he means by “the will.”
I do not think the answers are obvious! (In fact, I do not know the answer myself.) So read it, form your own impression, try to formulate a sentence or two that starts “Kant thinks the will is …”, and we will talk it through.
However, on re-reading the first section, I am less sure than I was that Kant thinks that acting from inclination is not the same thing as acting from self-interes. So maybe he is changing less than I thought and perhaps I was wrong to see him as making I thought of as a correct point.↩︎