According to Kant, there are three formulations of the categorical imperative.1
Last week we talked about the first formulation. This formulation has two different formulas (instructor grinds teeth): the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Law of Nature. Here they are.
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (4:421)
act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (4:421)
Today we are going to talk about the other two: the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy.
The Formula of Humanity is easy enough.
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (4:429)
The Formula of Autonomy is not expressed with great clarity in the text. Kant says that “the specific mark distinguishing categorical from hypothetical imperatives” is found “in the present third formula of the principle, namely the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” (4:432).
We will talk about why Kant thinks “a will giving universal law” is a way of describing autonomy in class. (It certainly sounds paradoxical.) But for now, we have a more pressing problem: that is not an imperative! He puts it in the form of an imperative later.
The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition. (4:440)
The Formula of Humanity is inspiring; the Formula of Autonomy is difficult. And we are going to do them both in one class.
We have three formulations of one thing: the categorical imperative.
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (4:421)
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (4:429)
choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition. (4:440)
These are all supposed to amount to the same thing. But the second sure looks different from the other two. And if they are the same, why do we need them all? Why did he think he need to write such a long and repetitive chapter?
Kant gives an answer! He says that all maxims have three features and he implies that each formulation of the categorical imperative corresponds to one of these features (see 4:336).
“A form, which consists in universality.” Establishing this is the job of the formula of universal law / formula of law of nature.
“A matter, namely an end.” This is supplied by the second formulation, which tells us to treat humanity as an end in itself.
“A complete determination of all maxims by means of that formula, namely that all maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends.” I can’t tell you what that sentence means, but it is pretty clear that he is thinking of the formula of autonomy here; autonomous people give laws to themselves.
Kant thinks he has established that if there are moral duties, they are expressed as categorical imperatives, that is, imperatives that apply to you regardless of what you want.
But it does not follow that there actually are any categorical imperatives. To establish that, Kant thinks he has to show that categorical imperatives could move you to act or, to use fancier terminology, he has to show that a categorical imperative could determine your will.
The will has ends. Usually, these are things that you want: I want a drink of water (that is my “end”), I know that the way to get one is to go to the water fountain (the relevant “means”), so I get up and go to the drinking fountain (action!). Kant thinks that my desire for water “grounds” a hypothetical imperative, namely “get up and go to the drinking fountain.”
Desires will not do for a categorical imperative since a categorical imperative applies regardless of what anyone wants. What kind of end could be relevant for a categorical imperative? Something that is valuable in itself and not just valued because people want it. Kant proposes that rationality is that something.
We are going to look pretty carefully at the argument on 4:429. I am going to break the paragraph up into chunks and add some numbers to make the course of the argument more clear.
If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
(1) The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions.
(2) But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on” just the same rational ground that also holds for me;
(3) thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means (4:429)
(3) is supposed to follow from (1) and (2). How does that work?
We are also going to take a close look at how Kant applies the formula of humanity to his four cases. So read 4:429-4:430 carefully.
What does he mean by treating another person as an end rather than “merely as a means”? I think the promise case is worth thinking about here.
What does he mean by treating yourself as a mere means? The suicide case is particularly relevant here.
The formula of autonomy is phrased in terms of laws. On the face of it, that is paradoxical. To be autonomous is to be free and laws limit our freedom.
Kant’s idea is that the relevant laws are ones that we give to ourselves. The contention of the last part of Section II is that morality is an expression of our autonomy because it is a set of rules that we give to ourselves.
Some things to think about include:
Is it autonomy if the moral laws are an expression of something that is the same in everyone, namely, reason, rather than something distinctive about the individual?
What is the picture of the moral life and how does it compare with Hume’s picture?