We ended our discussion of Hume by considering what he would say about our obligations to give famine aid. Specifically, we looked at the similarities and differences between Hume’s theory and that of a contemporary utilitarian, Peter Singer.
Today, we are going to do the same for Kant. Here, we are going to read a contemporary Kantian moral philosopher, Onora O’Neill. O’Neill’s essay is dedicated to comparing Kantian moral philosophy with utilitarianism. We are only going to discuss the parts that are about Kant’s moral philosophy.
O’Neill will take what we have called the Formula of Humanity as the best expression of Kant’s categorical imperative. She calls it by a different name, namely, “The Formula of the End in Itself.”
Sigh. Anyway the name isn’t important. Here is what it says.
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end. (4:429)
O’Neill explains what she takes Kant to mean by “maxim.” It is a policy or the principle underlying a person’s intention. To illustrate, if I intentionally give away ten percent of my income to famine relief this year, my maxim is “the principle of tithing his or her income for famine relief” (O’Neill 1980, 286). O’Neill does not think there is a significant difference between intentions and maxims; you can take even the most specific intention, such as the intention to scratch my nose right now, and make it a maxim by removing the parts that involve particular persons and times.
What is involved in treating someone as a “mere means” rather than as “an end in itself”? O’Neill notes that we inevitably treat others as means. Kant’s argument only concerns actions that threat others as mere means. She says this these actions usually involve deception or coercion. Specifically, she says that it involves involving another person “in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle consent.” (O’Neill 1980, 286).
She is drawing on what Kant said about the case of the false promise.
he who has it in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action. (4:429-430)
Kant asserts that the basic idea can be extended to all of the so-called perfect duties, such as duties to respect rights to things like freedom and property.
It might be worth thinking back about Hume’s discussion of the difference between the doctor and the mugger (Treatise 3.2.5 par. 15) and Deigh’s discussion of deception and promises in war to get a contrasting view of the morality of deception and coercion. Compare what they say with O’Neill’s description of the relationship between creditors and debtors on page 287.
You can treat another person as an end in themself in at least two ways.
By not treating them as a mere means: lying, coercing, e.g.
By “sharing some of their ends.” This is how she understands benevolence (“beneficence”).
The first category consists of the perfect duties: you can never treat others as a mere means.
The second category concerns imperfect duties: these are things you are required to do, but not always. Thus, “Beneficence requires that we act on some maxims that foster others’ ends, though it is a matter for judgment and discretion which of their ends we foster” (O’Neill 1980, 288).
Putting it together, we get this.
Kantians will claim that they have done nothing wrong if none of their acts is unjust, and that their duty is complete if in addition their life plans have in the circumstances been reasonably beneficent. (O’Neill 1980, 288)
It appears that there are several limits to Kantian duties towards famine victims.
Denying famine aid does not involve lying or coercion. (compare §27)
Nothing about the Kantian view of beneficence requires that priority go to those who are most in need. (compare §28)
Kantian ethics is about intentional behavior. It is silent when someone has no intention one way or another. (compare §29)
She means to question whether Kantian ethics really is limited in these ways in the next three sections: §§27-29.
Kantian ethics will be strictly opposed to cheating on food rationing rules and driving hard bargains with people who are starving.
It will also require the fulfillment of duties owed to particular persons, such as duties that parents owe to their children or vice versa.
What about people who live far away? O’Neill describes a variety of ways that they could deceive or coerce the famine victims; those would all be wrong.
She does not include failing to give aid in this section. It is not unjust and so is not a violation of a perfect duty on the Kantian scheme.
Famine aid “must stand very high among duties of beneficence” because beneficence involves helping others to pursue their ends or to be autonomous (O’Neill 1980, 292). Since famine victims cannot pursue any of their ends, they would get higher priority than people who are much better off.
She is most concerned to address a point made by Malthusians, such as Garrett Hardin, about how good intentions can have bad consequences. In particular, the Malthusians thought that saving people from a famine would lead to even larger famines in the future. Their idea was that people will reproduce at a greater rate than their available resources will grow. So saving people now means that the much larger future generations will suffer much larger famines.1
If they are right, then someone might act with good intentions to relieve famine now. But that would not be the right thing to do because it would result in even larger famines later.
O’Neill argues that if someone is aware of this alleged fact, that knowledge will be reflected in their intentions. If, for instance, they give famine aid despite believing that doing so will make the problem of famine worse in the future, then that is their intention. They do not simply intend to help the victims in front of them, period.
Utilitarians value life because only living beings can be happy. But utilitarians are willing to sacrifice lives in order to maximize overall happiness.
Kantians value human life because human beings are rational. They are unwilling to make one person the instrument of another’s survival or happiness.
That is, is it a moral problem rather than a political and economic one? O’Neill finds the distinction false.
What does O’Neill think Kant would say about the case of the drowning child?
What is the relationship between imperfect duties, such as the Kantian duty of beneficence, and the category of supererogatory actions?
More generally, what is an imperfect duty?
More specifically, what would the imperfect duty of beneficence tell us to do when there is a distant famine?
Note that an answer that would be inadequate in Singer’s eyes is not necessarily an inadequate answer. Maybe Kantians have only fuzzy things to say about famine because our duties are genuinely fuzzy. Singer demands crisp answers, but we do not have to accept his assumption that there are crisp answers to be given.