Philippa Foot seeks to show that Nietzsche did not, in fact, discredit morality.
In making her case, she provides a interesting interpretation of how Nietzsche tried to discredit morality.
The question Foot’s essay seeks to answer is: was Nietzsche right to think that he could discredit morality (Foot 1994, 3)?
Before she can answer that question, she needs to answer a different one: how did Nietzsche think that he could discredit morality? I think her answer is on page 6. She says that Nietzsche saw our common moral classifications as reflecting the needs of what he called the herd at the expense of what he called the exceptional man. Specifically, Foot believes, Nietzsche objected to the attempt to “determine the value of any kind of conduct in the case of each and every person” (Foot 1994, 6). As she understands him, “Nietzsche thinks of value as belonging only to a person who has created his own character in a pattern that cannot be prescribed for others” (Foot 1994, 6). His model, Foot believes, is art. Works of art are created by artists who operate without rules. But there are still distinctions between good and bad works of art. The artist, Foot believes, is Nietzsche’s model for the exceptional person who is held down by morality. He proposes, in essence, a “shift from moral to aesthetic valuation” (Foot 1994, 6).
To put it another way, if you look at life as an artistic creation, the idea that the most important values are expressed in rules that apply equally to everyone will seem ridiculous. That would be like thinking paint by numbers paintings are the greatest works of art.
Nietzsche’s challenge to morality might succeed if this could be presented as “an inspiring call to a kind of joyous paganism that would leave us with all that is best in morals” (Foot 1994, 6). That is what Foot is going to deny (see the bottom of page 6).
Her chief argument centers on justice, which she characterizes as “having to do with all that one person owes to another.” Justice, according to Foot forbids acts such as murder, torture, and enslavement for everyone. She takes Nietzsche to deny that these things are forbidden to everyone and she thinks that is objectionable (Foot 1994, 7).
Foot does not believe that Nietzsche himself was attracted to injustice. But she presents evidence from his writing that he thought even terrible acts could be glorious if they are done by the right people (Foot 1994, 8–9). A more fundamental point is that justice, as Foot understands it, involves treating people as equals while Nietzsche thinks that some people are superior to others (Foot 1994, 9–10).
Foot thinks that Nietzsche would reply that morality depends on “pious falsehoods” and, presumably, that if it were looked at honestly, it would no longer seem attractive (Foot 1994, 10).
The falsehoods include:
Free will (Foot 1994, 10–11).
Its understanding of human motivation. “Where moralists find altruism Nietzsche sees various kinds of egoism, self-mistrust, and fear” (Foot 1994, 12).
Its mistaken classification of some psychological drives such as cruelty as evil when, in fact, they are the condition of what is good (Foot 1994, 12).
Foot does not think that any of these arguments stand up. Since that is so, she asks, why bother reading him? The end of the essay is an attempt to answer that question. She makes two points.
First, she thinks Nietzsche is correct to think that our faith in morality cannot be wholly sustained without belief in God. She asks whether the lesson we should draw is that “the capacity to acquire justice” depends “on certain general human reactions to teaching, somewhat as it is with the capacity to learn to talk or to make calculations” (Foot 1994, 13).
Second, she thinks that Nietzsche’s kind of immoralism may become attractive again and so those who favor justice, as she understands it, have to point out his errors.
I would like to start out with the idea that we should think of our lives like artistic creations. In particular, I think it helps to see where Nietzsche is coming from. He thinks the fundamental question is “how should I live?” and that morality can only be part of the answer to that question.
I agree with what she says about justice: I am not in favor of murder or torture! But I wonder how you establish the value of justice. Maybe this is a case where everything depends on who has the burden of proof. If it is Nietzsche, he has not shown that justice is bunk and so he loses. If it is Foot, she has not shown that justice is more important than the kinds of creativity Nietzsche favors, and so she loses.
Finally, I want to talk about the three falsehoods that Nietzsche, as Foot reads him, thinks morality rests on. I agree that this is one of Nietzsche’s great themes, but I am not sure she has given the strongest statement of Nietzsche’s views here. For instance, I think it has to be at least a little unsettling that the desire for punishment is at odds with what we take to be moral motivations. That is, it sure does not look like either benevolence or a purely rational adherence to duty drives our thinking about punishment.