Singer is trying to prove that giving famine aid is morally mandatory. Here is his argument for that conclusion.
Suffering and death are bad. [Moral Assumption]
If (a) it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, (b) without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, (c) we ought, morally to do it. [Moral Principle]
We could prevent suffering and death by giving aid without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. [Factual Assumption]
Therefore, we ought, morally, to give aid. [Conclusion]
The balance of the article involves taking up and answering objections to points 2 and 3: questions about the moral principle are discussed on pp. 236-39; questions about whether famine aid really would relieve suffering are taken up on pp. 239-43.
Our focus will be on the principle: point 2. We want to know how he argues for it and how he defends it against objections.
Singer’s argument for this principle involves an example of a drowning child. His idea is that it is obvious that you should save the drowning child and that the principle is the best explanation of why you should do so. This is evidence that the principle is correct. If the principle is correct, in turn, he can use it in his argument about famine aid.
These are the major parts of Singer’s article. I find flat outlines like this helpful for following the course of an argument. Even though they aren’t very detailed, they keep me oriented. And because they aren’t very detailed, they are not hard to make.
Introduction to the problem (229-31).
Two versions of the principle he wants to defend and the basic argument in its favor (231–32). (This is the part that we will focus on in our discussion.)
Objections to Singer’s basic argument for his principle: the famine case is unlike the drowning child case (232–35).
Radical consequence of the argument: many acts that, according to commonsense ideas of morality, are merely matters of charity are in fact moral duties (235–36)
Objections to the principle itself. The objections maintain that an argument that conflicts too much with our commonsense understanding of charity and duty must be mistaken. Singer argues that we should admit that our commonsense understanding of these matters is indefensible (236–39).
Objections to the practical steps Singer recommends. These objections accept the idea that we’re required to give to those in need but they express doubts about whether privately provided famine relief will meet this goal. The third point isn’t really an objection but more of a question: how much should we give? (239–43)
Our focus is on Singer’s principle. He argues for it using the example of the drowning child. The idea is that if you think you must save the drowning child consistency requires that you agree that you must give a lot to famine aid.
We have to ask whether that is so. Could you agree that you must save the drowning child without agreeing that you must give a lot to famine aid? Is there a different principle that would tell you that you must save the drowning child without also telling you that you must give to famine aid?
Here is another way to put it. Look for ways that the two cases are different. Do those differences matter? Also, has Singer shown that they do not matter? (That is a slightly different question.) Those are the questions that we are going to talk about.
You may notice that there are two versions of Singer’s principle: a strong and a moderate version.
Here is what that means. Singer’s moral principle has two parts:
A part explaining why we have duties: we have to prevent suffering and death. (Roughly 2a in the argument I laid out in the first section.)
A part that makes exceptions to those duties: we do not have to prevent suffering and death if doing so means making a specified kind of sacrifice. (2b in the argument laid out in the first section.)
The strong version is: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it (Singer 1972, 231). It is described as strong because it requires a lot. The exceptions are narrow and the sacrifices it imposes can be severe.
The exceptions are for cases where preventing something bad would come at the expense of something of “comparable moral importance,” such as sacrificing another life. When that is so, we are not required to prevent the bad thing from happening.
The moderate version is: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it (Singer 1972, 241).
Here the exception to the duty is triggered at a much lower level. If saving the drowning child meant violating a promise to meet someone for lunch, that would be enough to show that you do not have a duty to do so. Breaking a promise is morally significant, after all.
Each version has problems. The strong version appears to claim more than the drowning child case can establish. If readers thought that it was morally mandatory to save the drowning child even at significant risk to the rescuer’s life, then the example might support something close to the strong version. But that is not how the example is presented so I don’t see that Singer has made his case for the strong version.
The moderate version has the opposite problem. Would you really say that the duty to save the child could be trumped by a lunch date? I hope not!
So it seems to me that more work remains to be done to formulate and argue for a persuasive version of Singer’s principle.
There were more interesting things said than I can record. So I am just going to try to summarize the point that we spent most of our time on.
As I presented Singer’s argument, it depends on showing that his principle is the best explanation of why you are supposed to save the drowning child. We start with the assumption that you are morally required to save the drowning child. Singer says his principle explains why that is so. That is a reason to believe his principle: it gets the correct answer in the drowning child case. If you believe his principle, in turn, you are close to agreeing with him about your duties to famine victims.
Assuming that is the way the argument is supposed to go, the way to challenge it is to find an alternative principle that also gets the right answer in the drowning child case without having the same implications for famine aid.
Max proposed one alternative involving proximity. Singer’s principle goes like this:
Max proposed this as an alternative.
One little word makes a big difference! The drowning child is nearby, so you have to save him. But famine victims are not, so you are off the hook for famine aid.1
Does that settle it? Well, we are at least at a tie. There are two principles that both explain the thing that seems obvious, namely, that you have to save the drowning child. We have to decide which one is better. We spent the bulk of our discussion time talking about how to do that.
Patrick was skeptical of Max’s alternative. He does not see why it would be relevant that the person you could save is near to you.
Tim, Mattie, and Kensi gave reasons why it might matter: you know more about the case, you can see the results of your efforts, and your are likely to be more effective.2 Max himself said that his version fits the facts about us; it is what we actually believe and you can see that this is so by looking at how we actually behave.
I had two contributions to the discussion. First, I said that I found Singer’s own answer to this point unsatisfactory. He uses big words like “universalizability” and “impartiality.” This is a bit like talking louder; it does not really add anything to the argument. That said, I myself agree with Patrick that proximity is not really relevant. I think that the reason why you save the drowning child is the one Singer gave: it prevents suffering and death. The fact that it is nearby is incidental, in my opinion.
But how do you prove that? I don’t know!
In my second point, I offered an argument that, while falling short of proof, might push things more in Singer’s direction. Instead of talking about duties to help others, I looked at duties not to hurt others. I asserted, without proof, that distance makes no difference to these duties: it is just as bad to drop a missile on someone far away as it is to shoot someone in the same room. If you find that example persuasive, you might think that proximity does not matter in the case at hand either.
You can contest this argument in at least two ways. First, you can say that my initial assertion is just wrong and that we do distinguish between hurting people who are nearby and those who are far away. Max tried this out. Second, you can say that the two classes of duties, duties not to hurt others and duties to help others, are very different. If that is so, perhaps the features of one class will not necessarily be shared by the other. Or, at least, it is my burden to show that they are similar in the way that I alleged.
Next time we will talk about a point that Sawyer raised. A big difference between the drowning child case and famine is that there are many more people who can help solve the famine problem.
These are the points that you should know.