One question in political philosophy is “why do I have to obey the
state?” As we saw last time, Plato thought there were at least two kinds
of answers to this question: one concerned an analogy between the state
and the people who raise you and the other concerns an agreement made
with the state.
Another question in political philosophy concerns the state itself.
Why do we have such a thing? Or, better, why should we have
such a thing? What is its purpose? Is it just to enable the powerful to
exploit the powerless, or is there some other reason?
Plato has an implicit answer here too. The state helps to make you
the kind of person you are; it is very much like a parent. After you
have grown up, the state provides you with the environment in which you
can lead your best life. A major part of Socrates’s reasons for staying
is that there is no other city that could sustain the kind of life he
prizes.
Hobbes has a very different understanding of the purpose of the
state. And while he does not think that the state is important for one’s
upbringing, he does think that the obligation to obey the state is based
on a kind of agreement.
The State of Nature
Hobbes’s case for the state rests largely on a description of what
life would be without it, in what is called a state of nature.
The state of nature, according to Hobbes, would be a “war of all
against all.” The state is good because it puts an end to this war.1
Hobbes gives three reasons for thinking that people in the state of
nature would be “in that condition which is called war” and, more
specifically, a war “of every man, against every man” (13.8).
Competition
Diffidence
Glory
How to Read Early Modern Philosophy
Here are two techniques for reading early modern philosophy (roughly
16th-18th century) that I find invaluable: backtracking and trees.
What I mean by backtracking is that whenever I find a little summary
statement, and especially one that mentions a specific number of
arguments, I immediately look back through the text to make sure I have
identified all the arguments.
For example there is a trigger to backtrack in this line in the sixth
paragaph.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of
quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
(Leviathan 13.6)
He was good enough to give capsule summaries of each.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and
the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves
masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second,
to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their
persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation,
their profession, or their name. (Leviathan 13.7)
After reading that, I know that the stuff I had read in the first
five paragraphs was supposed to show that there are three causes of
conflict that involve, respectively, gain, safety, and reputation. That
tells me how to chop up the text. You can see the fruits of my labor in
the gray outline headings that I added to the text.
Another useful technique is to look for the trees, especially at the
beginning of a chapter. Trees? Well, conceptual trees. Early
modern authors often start off with a root idea and branches; that’s
what I am calling a conceptual tree. For example, at the beginning of
chapter thirteen, Hobbes says that people are equal in body and mind.
The next logical part of the paragraph makes the point about bodily
equality and the one after that is about mental equality. If you pay
attention to the first sentence, you know where to find the major break
points in the rest of the paragraph.
The early moderns loaded up their writing with little tips like that.
Once you get in the habit of looking for them, you will find that they
are very useful. Plus it’s kind of fun to search them out. It’s like
finding clues in an ancient map.
OK, back the substance of the thing.
Competition
The first explanation of war in the state of nature links conflict to
scarcity: people fight for access to scarce resources. Hobbes says this
follows from a premise about equality, so we are going to have to start
with what he means in saying we are equal.
It’s not obvious! Does he mean we are literally equal? That isn’t
true. But if he does not mean that, what does he mean? The way to think
about this is to think about what inequality would amount to.
Equality is supposed to give rise to the causes of war. What kind of
inequality prevents war?
Another thing we will do is talk about what assumptions Hobbes is
making about the world in which people live and about their motivations.
For instance, Hobbes is assuming that there is scarcity. What else is he
assuming?
Diffidence
The second explanation of war in the state of nature links conflict
to insecurity: diffidence, the opposite of confidence.
1. Lack of confidence or faith in someone or something; distrust;
mistrust, misgiving, doubt. Also: an instance of this; a doubt, a
misgiving. Now rare except as merged with sense 2.
2. Doubt in one’s own ability, merit, or judgement; lack of
self-confidence; modesty or shyness resulting from this.
Hobbes is clearly using meaning 1. As the entry notes, that is now
rare except when it is used along with meaning 2. You can see meaning 2
as well: people doubt their ability to defend themselves if attacked.
That is why you need the OED.
We can do the same thing here. What is Hobbes assuming both about how
the world works and about what people want?
For instance, what does he mean by “there is no way for any man to
secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation” (13.4)? What is
“anticipation”?
In addition, why does he think it follows that if those who would
“otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not
by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by
standing only on their defence, to subsist” (13.4)?
Glory
The third reason for conflict is the strangest. People fight for
reputation. It looks as though Hobbes is saying that we are just
quarrelsome, like drunks looking for a fight. If so, it is hard to see
how this is a cause of conflict that the state could solve. If we’re
liable to fly off the handle for the slightest reason just because
that’s the way we are, we will still be that way even with the
state.
I don’t think that’s right. I think the concern with reputation has a
rational basis and that it makes sense to be more concerned about it in
the state of nature than in the commonwealth. A reputation for defending
your honor makes you look powerful and people who look powerful
actually become powerful by attracting allies.
But I do not want to go into that in our class. I can make the point
only by using material outside of our readings and that would take us
too far afield. So I am just going to say that this is what I think is
going on and tell you that the support is found in chapter 10. I will
put the relevant passages in an appendix
below, but you may feel free to ignore them.
The social contract
In chapter 17, Hobbes begins by recapitulating the case he made about
the state of nature. He ends it with a description of the social
contract. This is what he thinks will solve the problems of the state of
nature by creating a state.
We will want to talk about at least three things.
Is his description of the state of nature accurate?
If so, has he described a cause of war that the state can
solve?
If so, is the social contract a way of getting to the
solution?
Main Points
Here are the main things you should know or have an opinion about
after today’s class.
The three causes of conflict: competition, diffidence, and
reputation. What do those words mean and how do the explanations
work?
People lived without states for thousands of years. How does that
affect Hobbes’s argument, in your opinion?
Can the state solve the problems with the state of
nature?
Can the social contract create the state?
Glory and Power
The third cause of conflict is glory. What does that mean? I think
Hobbes thought of it as a source of power. People ally themselves with
those who they think are powerful. And one way of looking powerless is
by letting insults go without retaliating. Here are the parts of the
book where I think he says that; they are from chapter 10.
The power of a man, (to take it universally,) is his present
means, to obtain some future apparent good; and is either
original or instrumental.
Natural power, is the eminence of the faculties of body, or
mind: as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence,
liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers, which
acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire
more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God,
which men call good luck. For the nature of power, is in this point,
like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy
bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste.
The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the
powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil,
that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is
the power of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each
particular; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions
leagued. Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is
power: for they are strengths united.
Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case
they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.
Reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the
adherence of those that need protection.
So is reputation of love of a man’s country, (called popularity,) for
the same reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have
the assistance, and service of many.
Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom, or
good fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him. (Hobbes,
Leviathan 10.1-8)
Here we start with a tree. The root concept is power. This is divided
into two branches: original (or natural) and instrumental. Original or
natural power is the power you have on your own: your strength or
intelligence, say. While important, it isn’t very interesting. There
isn’t much to say about it beyond “some people have it and others
don’t.”
Instrumental powers are more interesting. These are powers that
enable you to gain more power. Riches, reputation, and good luck are
examples. Why does having these things enable someone to gain more
power? Because they attract other people. Everyone wants to be
on the side of a powerful person, roughly.
That is what is going on with glory. The reason why people fight over
small insults to themselves or their group is that letting the insults
go would be a sign that you aren’t powerful. The fight to preserve their
reputation for power, in other words. And they do so because having a
reputation for power makes someone genuinely powerful because it
attracts followers.
Is it true?
Hobbes is surely exaggerating some features of the state of nature.
It can’t really be solitary or a war of “every man against every man.”
There are clearly groups and social interaction. The only way that glory
makes sense as a cause of conflict is if defending your honor gains you
what Hobbes calls “instrumental power” by impressing other people. That,
in turn, assumes that people are willing to work together in the ways
Hobbes describes in chapter 10.
That said, I think the basic dynamics are not really altered if we
introduce groups into the state of nature. Calling it a “war of every
group against every group” is probably more accurate even though it is
not as catchy.2
Hobbes did not rely on arguments alone. He gave some empirical
evidence to substantiate his points. For instance, the fact that we lock
our doors at night shows we worry that other people will take advantage
of us. And the fact that states are constantly at war with one another
suggests that the dynamic of conflict outside of the state’s authority
is real. Finally, Hobbes did a little armchair anthropology, pointing to
the Americas as an example of a place where people live in a state of
nature.
Here is another fact that Hobbes did not use but that supports his
case. It is that human beings kill adult members of their species at far
higher rates than other animals do. My source is a very interesting book
called War in Human Civilization by Azar Gat. Gat’s explanation
of the asymmetry fits Hobbes’s assumption about the importance of the
tactic of anticipation, that is, striking first. Here is Gat in his own
words.
Among animals, it is mostly the young that stand at the receiving end
of intraspecific killing, whereas adults … are relatively secure. By
contrast, among humans, although women and children were often killed,
it was mainly the men fighters themselves who suffered most of the
casualties. With humans too, deadly fighting was asymmetrical, in the
sense that it was conducted under conditions in which the enemy were
caught helpless and unable to fight back, mostly by surprise. However,
among humans, the asymmetry regularly rotated, with the receiving and
inflicting ends changing places: the helpless victim of today’s raid was
himself the raider tomorrow. Thus the adult fighters themselves bore the
brunt of the casualties … What is the source of this difference between
humans and other animals?
Mutual deterrence, which is generally effective among adult animals,
fails in humans under certain conditions … because of that principal
threat to deterrence: first-strike capability. Why do humans possess it
to a much larger degree than other animal species? It is because of the
most distinctive human capability: tool making. The more advanced the
capability became, the more lethal humans became. …
As with other animal species, they normally did not seriously fight
conspecifics on the open battlefield for fear of being hurt themselves.
However, unlike other animal species, they were able to kill adult
conspecifics by surprise, when their adversaries were unarmed and
vulnerable. (Gat 2006,
128–29)
In other words, it is true that adult chimpanzees will kill other
adults if they can catch them by surprise. But human beings are far
better at catching one another by surprise. Also, because they rely on
weapons rather than their physical strength, teeth, and claws, human
beings are more likely to be caught defenseless.
After tallying up the estimated rates of violent death among
hunter-gatherers and non-state agricultural societies, Gat makes a back
of the envelope conjecture that “average human violent mortality rates
among adults in the state of nature may have been in the order of 15 per
cent (25 per cent for men)” (Gat 2006, 131).
That is a phenomenally high rate. There are 14 people in our class.
If we were in the state of nature, we would expect two of us to be
killed by another person. Needless to say, it would be shocking if that
happened.
References
Gat, Azar. 2006. War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. (1651) 1993. Leviathan. Edited by Mark C.
Rooks. British Philosophy: 1600-1900. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex
Corporation.
Of course, states have wars with one another. Hobbes
does not think that wars among states are intolerable in the way that
violence among individuals is (see Leviathan 13.12).↩︎
That said, we should not ignore the possibility that
individual level violence within social groups would be quite high; if
it is, then Hobbes’s language would be more appropriate. Given what I
have read, I am inclined to think that there was, in fact, quite a lot
of individual level violence within social groups in pre-state
societies.↩︎