The problem of free will is generated by two seemingly incompatible beliefs. On the one hand, the course of our lives is determined by factors outside of our control, ranging from our upbringing to the laws of physics. On the other hand, we very much believe that we are free to choose what we do and our practices of holding people responsible for their behavior seem to assume that this is so.
Hobart believes that freedom is compatible with determinism, meaning that our behavior can be free even if it is caused. He argues against those who believe that freedom and determinism are incompatible with one another and, in particular, with those who believe our behavior is free from any causes.
An action is an intentional movement of the body. By contrast, an unintentional movement of my body, like my heart’s beating, is not an action. The question about free will concerns what must be true for our actions to be free.
There are four possible positions on free will. They are identified by their answers to two questions.
Is determinism true? The two answers make up the columns in the table below.
Is it possible that our actions are free, and that we are responsible for at least some of the things we do, even if determinism is true? The answers here are the rows.
| Determinism is true (determinism) | Determinism is false | |
|---|---|---|
| Yes, freedom & responsibility are compatible with determinism | Compatibilism (Hobart, Frankfurt) | – (no one) |
| No, they are not (incompatibilism) (Rosen) | Hard Determinism | Libertarianism (a.k.a. “indeterminism”) |
These labels are wonky. “Incompatibilism” is the name for the bottom row but “compatibilism” is only the name of the northwest box. And “hard determinism” is the name for only the southwest box while plain “determinism” refers to the whole western column. Finally, Hobart uses the term “indeterminist” to refer to the position that is now called libertarianism. But we play the hand we are dealt.
Here is what these terms mean.
Determinism is the view that everything that happens is causally determined. To put it another way, everything that happens is the effect of a separate cause and causes make their effects happen. This includes human actions.
Hobart defends a restricted version of determinism. He thinks that people’s character determines their actions. He takes no position on whether the universe is deterministic or not. His contention is just that actions are causally determined.1
Compatibilism is the view that our actions can be free, and we can be held responsible for what we do, even if determinism is true.
Incompatibilism is the view that actions cannot be free, and we cannot be held responsible for what we do, if determinism is true.
Hard determinism combines incompatibilism and determinism.
Libertarianism, or what Hobart calls “indeterminism,” combines incompatibilism with the denial that determinism is true.
Hobart’s point is that an action can be attributed to a person only if it is caused by that person’s character. To put it another way, an action counts as being yours only if it is caused by some element of your psychology such as something that you want or your character. If you can act only if the movement of your body is caused, then you can only act freely, or be held responsible for an action, if the movement of your body is caused.
He thinks that those who believe that actions are not causally determined, that is, indeterminists, have an incoherent position. They insist that actions are free only if they are not caused and also that people (or “the self”) acts. As Hobart sees it, a person can act only if some element of the person’s psychology causes that person’s body to move. An action cannot count as mine if it does not have this kind of cause. So if there is an uncaused movement of my body, it cannot be my action. That is why the title of his essay is “Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable Without It.”
Hobart’s essay does not really follow an outline in the way that, say, Hume’s writing does. You would be forgiven for finding it more than a little repetitive. He is also in the habit putting an objection to his position together with his replies to the objection in a single paragraph. That makes his paragraphs quite long and it leads him to give skimpy statements of the objections to his position.
Still, there is a structure to it. Pay special attention to the sections that are in italics.
Thesis: “The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opponsed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination” (Hobart 1934, 1). He goes on about what he means for a couple pages. (pp. 1-3).
Target: indeterminism. The thinkers that Hobart calls indeterminists hold “that a free act of will is the act of the self” and that the “self becomes through it the author of the physical act that ensues,” that is, the “volition of the self causes the physical act but it is not in turn caused” (Hobart 1934, 3–4). The uncaused cause of an action, according to the indeterminist, is “spontaneous” (Hobart 1934, 4).
The indeterminist denies that actions are caused by a person’s character and circumstances. “The self feels motives but its act is not determined by them,” rather, “it can choose between them” (Hobart 1934, 4).
Indeterminists also maintain that it would not make any sense to hold either ourselves or others responsible if actions were not free in this way (Hobart 1934, 4).
Hobart’s basic point. Hobart says that when we hold ourselves or others responsible for their actions, we do so by connecting what they did with their character traits. (pp. 4-6)
The indeterminist’s basic point. Elements of our psychology, like our character traits or motives, only incline us to act; if they caused our actions, then we would not be the ones who are acting. We act by choosing and that is distinct from being caused to act by our motives: “We choose amongst the ideas of action before us, but need not choose solely according to the attractions of desire … our inmost self may rise up in its autonomy and moral dignity, independently of motive, and register its sovereign degree” (Hobart 1934, 6).
Hobart replies. The self is made up of its motivations and character traits. The indeterminists say there must be a self in addition to those things that makes choices. Hobart believes the two sides are thinking at different levels of analysis. The indeterminists say it is a self, and not something else, that makes choices while the determinists are talking about how a self makes choices. (pp. 6-7)
Concept 1: Freedom. From this point on in the essay, Hobart takes up terms used by indeterminists to object to the compatibilist position. Unsurprisingly, he defends the compatibilist position on each one of them.
The first term is “freedom” (p. 8). According to Hobart, “free will means freedom of persons in willing” (Hobart 1934, 8). More helpfully, he says that a person is free if he or she (a) has a power to do something and (b) there is no interference with the exercise of that power. To give an example, I am free to get a drink of water if I am capable of getting a drink of water and no one prevents me from doing so.
Concept 2: Can. One way of putting the indeterminist position is to say that if our actions are caused, then we cannot do anything other than the thing that we are caused to do. That strikes them as showing that actions that are caused are not free.
Hobart denies that this is so. He says that I have (a) the power to get a drink of water and (b) the power not to get a drink of water if (c) I could get a drink of water if that is what I want or (d) I could abstain from getting a drink of water if that is what I want. The fact that I want to get a drink does not mean I do not have the power to abstain from getting one, even if my desire causes me to get a drink. If I had not wanted a drink of water, I could have abstained. So I can do either one. (pp. 8-9)
Objection: if an action is caused, the cause makes it happen and the person cannot do otherwise. So it is not true that I can abstain from getting a drink if my thirst causes me to do so. Hobart replies to the objection in the same paragraph. (p. 10)
Concept 3: Compulsion. Indeterminists say that caused actions are compelled. Hobart disagrees. (p. 13)
Concept 4: Passivity. Indeterminists say that causes render us passive rather than active; the idea, I take it, is that we only act if we are active. Hobart disagrees. (pp. 13-14)
Concept 5: Spontaneity. Indeterminists described uncaused choices as spontaneous. Hobart says that only the determinist understanding makes sense. (p. 14)
Concept 6: Source. Indeterminists say that people are the source of their actions. Hobart says that only the determinist account of how people are the source of their actions makes any sense. (pp. 14-15)
Concept 7: Prediction. One reason why indeterminism is attractive is that the thought that our actions are predictable is repellent. (This assumes that if actions are caused, they could be predicted.) How does Hobart handle this objection? (pp. 15-16)
Concept 8: Material Fate, also known as fatalism. Indeterminists say that if determinism were true there would be no point in thinking about what to do. For example, “I am fated either to keep smoking or to quit regardless of what I decide, so there is no point in trying to make a decision.” Hobart believes this involves a mistake. What is it? (pp. 16-17)
Concept 9: Self as Product and Producer, that is, blame. Indeterminists say that we can blame someone for an action only if the person did it without having been caused to do it. Hobart thinks that the opposite is true: we can blame people for what they do only if their actions are caused. Why? (pp. 17-23)
Concept 10: Responsibility. This is similar to the discussion of blame. (pp. 23-24)
Concept 11: Desert. This is similar to the discussions of responsibility and blame. (pp. 24-27). This section includes Hobart’s opinions about the purposes of punishment. He has a consequentialist view: punishment is justified if it brings about better consequences than the alternatives. So, for instance, he thinks that punishment should repair harm done to the victim and deter future crime (see p. 25). He does not think that someone who does something wrong deserves punishment in a deep way. Compatibilists often take this kind of position on punishment. Those who think that the purpose of punishment is primarily to see that those who do bad things get what they deserve, by contrast, are usually libertarians (what Hobart calls indeterminists).
Concluding paragraph. Hobart thinks the discussion of free will has been a waste of time because the indeterminists have misunderstood the determinist position. (p. 27)