Hobart is a compatibilist; he believes that freedom is compatible with determinism. Rosen is an incompatibilist; he believes the opposite.
In particular, Rosen argues that it would be unfair to hold people responsible for doing things that they were determined to do. That is, the debate between the compatibilists and incompatibilists is framed as being about when it is fair to hold people responsible for what they do.
Rosen’s essay is a review of a book by R. Jay Wallace. Wallace is a compatibilist, like Hobart. His book argues that it can be fair to blame people for what they do even if their behavior is caused. Wallace proposes that it is fair to blame people for what they do when two things are true.
What they do is wrong (i.e. “morally impermissible”).
The person who did the thing that was wrong had “the powers of rational self-control.” These powers include the ability to understand right and wrong and the general ability to apply this knowledge by regulating one’s behavior.
The first point seems pretty obvious: you would not blame someone for doing the right thing!1
The second point is the one that will carry the most weight in a discussion of free will. Wallace argues in his book that someone could know the difference between right and wrong and apply this knowledge to regulate her behavior even if her behavior was causally determined. If I was brought up well, I will know the difference between right and wrong and I will have the ability to make the right choice about how to behave.
If, despite having these abilities, I do the wrong thing, then, according to Wallace’s proposal it would be fair to blame me for doing so. And this would be so even if my choice was causally determined by other aspects of my nature or circumstances.
In explicating Wallace’s argument, Rosen refers to “the standard excuses” (Rosen 2002, 700–701). These are, as you might have guessed, excuses. For example, an excuse for pushing you over is “I tripped!” If you believe me, you will not blame me for pushing you over. It was just an accident and not something I did on purpose.
Or suppose my son pushes you over; maybe you were standing in front of the books at the store. I could try to excuse his behavior by saying “he is just a kid.” Again, the idea is that you should not blame him. In this case, you should not blame him because he does not know any better or because he cannot control his behavior.
These excuses identify some causes of behavior as excuses for what was done: my tripping or his immaturity. Wallace contends that these excuses do not extend to all causes of behavior. That is part of his case for compatibilism, which holds that you can sometimes be responsible for things you do even if they are caused.
You can see the idea in the examples. If I pushed you because I wanted to knock you down, that would be very different from pushing you because I tripped. You would hold me responsible in the first case but not the second. Similarly, if my son were mature, you would blame him for knocking you over; since he is not, you would not. Some causes of behavior, such as wanting to do the thing that was done, are compatible with being responsible while others, such as tripping, are not.
Rosen begins with two examples. Bill Buckner failed to catch a ball that almost any professional baseball player would catch almost all of the time. As a consequence, his team lost. Fans blamed Buckner for his error, but, Rosen argues, that makes no sense if it was causally determined that he would miss the ball (Rosen 2002, 701–2).
Or suppose that it was destined that Judas would betray Jesus. Jesus does predict that he will, with eerie precision. And it is said that his betrayal is part of God’s plan for the redemption of humanity from sin. Given that God himself set Judas up, is it fair to blame him (Rosen 2002, 702)?
Note that both Buckner and Judas meet the conditions. They do something wrong, they know what they should do, and they have the general ability to control their behavior.2
Compatibilists say that Judas was capable of doing otherwise if he had wanted to. That is, if Judas had wanted to be faithful to Jesus, nothing would have forced him to betray Jesus. They think this means he could have done other than he did and so it is OK to hold him responsible for what he did.
Rosen, by contrast, thinks that if determinism is true, then Judas did not have the ability to want to do otherwise. His course was pre-ordained and entirely outside of his control. That, to Rosen, means he cannot be held responsible for what he did (Rosen 2002, 704–5).
In his last section, Rosen refers to “nomic necessity.” This will not be important for our purposes and you may ignore it. If you are curious, “nomic necessity” refers to the laws of nature. The idea is that the laws of nature specify how things have to be: for example, nothing can exceed the speed of light. But the laws of nature could be different; they themselves are not necessary. So it is impossible to exceed the speed of light as a matter of nomic necessity. But it is possible to imagine that the laws of nature are different so that something could exceed the speed of light. As I said, you can ignore this.