Overview

Lucretius was a Roman philosopher who lived first century BC. On the Nature of Things is an epic poem elaborating on the philosophy of Epicurus, a Greek philosopher who we have met before.¹

Lucretius, like other Epicureans, defends materialism and determinism. He has a reason for this. He thinks that understanding what we truly are will make our lives better. For example, we will be better off if we do not fear eternal punishment after death.

But what about death itself? Lucretius tried to argue that this too is not something to be feared. “Death, then, is nothing to us” (830, p. 89). That is what we are going to talk about today.

Lucretius’s first argument

Lucretius’s first argument is that death is nothing to us because we won’t be there to experience it.

“If it happens that people are to suffer unhappiness and pain in the future, they themselves must exist at that future time for harm to be able to befall them; and since death takes away this possibility by preventing the existence of those who might have been visited by troubles, you may be sure that there is nothing to fear in death, that those who no longer existe cannot become miserable, and that it makes not one speck of difference whether or not they have ever been born once their mortal life has been snatched away by deathless death.” (863, p. 90)

Here is how you can spell that out.

1. Premise about the necessary condition of something’s being bad for you: you have to be there to experience it.
2. Premise about the nature of death: when you are dead you will not experience anything.
3. Conclusion about whether death is bad: it is not!

Lucretius’s second argument

Death is like the time before we were born. That was not bad. So why should you fear death?

“Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep?” (972f, 94)

Here is how this one goes.

1. Premise about a necessary condition of death being bad: death is bad only if non-existence is bad.
2. Premise about non-existence not being bad: non-existence before birth isn’t bad.
3. Premise about what death is like: it is just like the time before birth.
4. Conclusion about whether death is bad: nope.

Lucretius’s third argument

Since death is infinitely long, prolonging life makes no difference. You will still be dead for an infinitely long time whether you die sooner or later (1088f, 98). If death is bad, it will be just as bad no matter when you die.