Benjamin Libet’s experiments have convinced many people that we lack
free will. These experiments seem to show that physical processes in the
brain that cause our hands to move happen before we make the conscious
decision to move our hands. In other words, our brains decide what we
are going to do before we do. Libet himself, however, does not draw this
conclusion. He believes our actions are free because we have the ability
to veto the decisions that our brains make.
The experiments
The experiments measure two things:
Readiness Potential (RP): electrical signals in the brain that
precede voluntary acts.
When someone is aware (i.e. conscious) of having decided to
act.
The subjects in the experiment are put in a device that measures
electrical activity in their brains. While they are in the device, they
can see a clock that measures time in milliseconds (msec).
They are told to move their hand whenever they want to and mark the
time when they make the decision.
What the experiments show is that the electrical activity that
precedes voluntary movements happens about 400 milliseconds before the
subjects think they made the decision to move their hands.
You might ask how the timing could possibly be accurate. No one can
track milliseconds on a clock, after all.
They thought of this. There is one more measurement. The subjects
were asked to report the timing of a stimulus to their skin made by the
experimenters. The experimenters know exactly when the stimulus happened
and so they can easily calculate the difference between when the
subjects report being aware of something, like the stimulus to the skin,
and when it actually happened. The difference is about 50
milliseconds.
They assume that the gap between making a decision to move your hand
and reporting being aware of that decision will have the same gap. So
they add 50 milliseconds from the reported time to get what they believe
is the actual time the subject was aware of having made a decision (Libet 1999,
50–51).
What does it mean?
On the face of it, these experiments suggest that we do not have free
will. Our brains start preparing for action before we are aware of
deciding to act. What we think of as our decision to do something seems
irrelevant to the movement of our bodies. The conscious decision comes
well after the brain has already started taking the steps to make the
body move, after all.
Libet, however, believes there is more to the story. He thinks his
experiments have shown that we have the ability to exercise a conscious
veto. A subject can have the readiness potential that normally precedes
voluntary action but prevent action by making a conscious decision not
to act (Libet 1999,
52).
If we do not have free will, maybe we have free won’t?1
Seriously, though, this would be a revisionist account of free will.
Instead of initiating our actions, our role as free agents lies in
serving as a gatekeeper who prevents the brain from completing some of
the actions that it initiates. That said, Libet asserts this is all
consistent with ordinary understandings of moral responsibility (Libet 1999, 54).
More broadly, Libet regards determinism as unproven. Since there is
some experimental evidence that suggests the conscious mind can control
the physical brain, he thinks libertarianism is the best position (Libet 1999,
55–57).
Consciousness and free will
Libet is clearly putting a lot of weight on the assumption that
conscious decisions, that is, decisions we are aware of making, are
essential to free will. Here is how he puts it.
a free will process implies one could be held consciously responsible
for one’s choice to act or not to act. We do not hold people responsible
for actions performed unconsciously, without the possibility of
conscious control. For example, actions by a person during a psychomotor
epileptic seizure, or by one with Tourette’s syndrome, etc., are not
regarded as actions of free will. (Libet 1999, 52)
It is not obvious to me that this is correct.
Main points
You should be familiar with these points from today’s class.
How the Libet experiments work.
Why the experiments seem to threaten free will.
Why Libet is a libertarian.
Also, it would not hurt to have an opinion about the role the
conscious decisions play in free will.
References
Libet, Benjamin. 1999. “Do We Have Free Will?”Journal
of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9): 47–57.