

## Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Condition	Claim	False if ...
A is a necessary condition of B	If B, then A	B and not-A
C is a sufficient condition of D	If C, then D	C and not-D

Vegetables (§4)

1. Being the same mass of matter is a necessary condition of being the same tree.
2. Being the same mass of matter is a sufficient condition of being the same tree.

Persons: “§12. But the question is, ‘whether if the same substance which thinks, be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?’” (Locke [1690] 2019, 401)

“if the same substance which thinks, be changed, it can be the same person” = is being the same substance a necessary condition of being the same person?

“or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?” = is being the same substance a sufficient condition of being the same person?

1. Being the same mass of matter is a necessary condition of being the same person.
2. Being the same mass of matter is a sufficient condition of being the same person.
3. Being the same immaterial substance is a necessary condition of being the same person. (see §13)
4. Being the same immaterial substance is a sufficient condition of being the same person. (see §14)

## 1 Vegetables, like trees

“4. We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants.” (Locke [1690] 2019, 398)

## 2 Persons

“§9. ... to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. ... For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that *Person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and it is by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.” (Locke [1690] 2019, 400)

## References

Locke, John. (1690) 2019. “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.” In *Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources*, edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, 3rd ed., 346-451. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.